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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

ST.ATE OF U'TAH
A. E. UPTON,

App·ellant,
-vs.HEISELT CONSTRUCTIO·N COMPANY, L. H. HEISELT and ANNIE
RAY HEISELT, Administratrix of
the Estate of L. H. HEIS.ELT,
Deceased,
Respon,dent.

Case No. 8240

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF' THE CASE
Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the record.
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
The Staternent of the case by plaintiff is prolix and
there are son1e inaccuracies. The factual situation here
presented is very simple.
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Defendant's decedent, L. H. Heiselt, n1oved to stay
execution on the judgment rendered against hin1 on the
ground that he ha;d ·been discharged in bankruptcy (Supplemental Record). Thereafter, as ad1ninistratrix of his
estate, defendant was substituted as a party defendant
( 16). The trial court granted the n1otion and stayed ex-

ecution (74, 75).
D·ecedent filed his petition in bankruptcy October
23, 1940 and a schedule of his debts was filed at ~that time.
(Ex. 1-A) Defendant admits that decedent's liability on
the note for which the judgment was obtained was not
scheduled hut -contends plaintiff had "notice or actual
knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy" within time
to file the claim.
Judgment against decedent was rendered June 19,
1948, on his endorser's liability on a note due May 15,
1937, the a-ction having been commenced June 9, 1943. The
note wa.s secured by mor~tgage and the maker and the
n1ortgage were discharged because of the statute· of limitations.
Decedent was dis·charged in bankruptcy J'anuary 14,
1949.
We wi'll go into neces'Sary factual detail as we answer
each of plaintiff's points in the 01~der they appear in his
brief.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
P·OINT I.
THE UTAH COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION.

POINT II.
THE CONTROVERSY IS NOT RES JUDICATA.

1. Where ju,dgment is obtained against a bankrupt
between the time of his adjudication and his dischar.qe
on a debt in existen,ce before adjudication, the debt and
judgment are discharged even though he did not assert
his adjudication and request a stay before judgment
obtained.
2. Proceedings in the Ba,nkruptcy Court in Colorado
are not res judicata of proceedings now before the court.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF DECEDENT'S PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY WITHIN THE
PERIOD ALLOWED FOR THE FILING OF CLAIMS AND
HENCE HIS CLAIM WAS BARRED BY DECEDENT'S DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY.

POINT IV.
THE DEBT UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED
WAS A PROVABLE DEBT.

ARGUMENT
P·OINT I.
THE UTAH COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION.

No formal action has been filed in the Colorado courts
(23). Defendant adrninistratrix testified that plaintiff
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filed the clain1 based on the judgn1ent here involved \Yith
the probate court in Conejos County, Colorado. She
denied the claim (21, 22), and no further steps have been
taken to have the claim judicially determined.
Plaintiff's position is that the Utah Courts do not
have jurisdiction beeause proceedings have been c.on1menced in Colorado. He did not attempt to obtain a stay
of the Utah proceedings until the claim was judicially
determined in Colorado, but filed a motion to strike the
Application for Substitution filed by defendant administratrix (15) asserting lack of jurisdiction.
The rule applicable here is stated in 21 C.J.S. 855,
Courts, S.ection 548:
"The p~endency of an action in the courts of
one state or eountry is not a bar to the institution
of another action between the same parties and
for the same cause of action in a court of another
state or eountry, nor is it the duty of the court
in which the latter action is brought to stay the
same pending a determination of the earlier
action, even though the court in which the earlier
action is brought has jurisdiction sufficient to
dispose of the entire controversy."
The authorities cited by plaintiff express the rule
applicable to courts of the same state.
14 Am. Jur. 440, Courts, Section 246, after stating
the rule quoted by plaintiff, states:
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"One of the apparent exceptions to the rule
that the court first acquiring jurisdiction must
be permitte:a to exercise it to the end arises wh.en
a person suing in one state subsequently begins
an action for the same matter and against the
same parties in another state, or in one of the
national courts, or when, after first resorting
to a national court, he subsequently institutes an
action in a state court. In either ease it is probably true that the court first acquiring jurisdiction must proceed to a final determination of
the controversy, 'and yet it is at least equally
true that the court last resorted to 1nay also proceed. While in such a case the suits may proceed
concurrently, still the judg1nent first rendered
may be pleaded in bar of any further maintenance of the other suit."
Tlie subject of stay of civil proceedings pending
deter1nination of an action in another state is annotated
in 19 A.L.R. 2d 301. It is there recognized that the courts
of each state may have jurisdiction of the same cause.
After stating the rule relating to courts of the same state
relied on by plaintiff, the annotator states:

"* * * This principle, however, does not
hold true in the case of a pending action in
another jurisdiction, it being uniformly held that
the pendency of another action in another jurisdiction, though between the same parties and
upon the same cause of action as the one subsequently instituted at the forum, is not a bar or
ground for the abatement of the later 'action at
the forum. This is true even though the foreign
court in which the prior action was commenced
had complete jurisdiction of the parties and of
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the action. See 1 Am Jur, Abaten1ent and R.evival § 39. And the two suits may proceed until
judgment is rendered in one of them, which judgment may then he pleaded in bar in the other."
The plaintiff here did not seek a stay of proceedings
but sought an outright dismissal. But it would h'ave been
\vithin the discretion of the trial court to deny a stay
herein even if it were requested.
The Utah judgment is the source, so to speak, of
plaintiff's claim. Defendant administratrix seeks to dry
up the claim at its source. Courts are hesitant about
annulling or holding for naught judg1nents of another
state, 21 C.J.S. 858, Cou~ts, Section 552. The Utah court
having held its judgment discharged by bankruptcy and
having permanently stayed execution, defendant will be
~ble to establish this in any court where plaintiff may
seek to enforce the judgment. Defendant will be able to
rely on the decision of a Utah Court concerning its own
judgment and will not have to rely, if she could, upon a
decision of a foreign court.
The reme:dy here obtained by defendant is recognized
by all authorities.
21 Am. Jur. 292, Executions, Section 604 states:

"* * * A stay of execution is also available
where the judgment debtor has been releived
fro~ the .judgment through the operation of proceedings In bankruptcy or insolvency."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
As indicated by 7 Remington on Bankruptcy 743,
Sec. 3488:
"After the discharge is gran ted the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court to stay ceases,
for thenceforth the bankrupt must obtain his
rights under the discharge from the court wherein he is sued."
See 6 Arn. Jur. (Rev. Ed.) 740, Bankruptcy, Section
313, vvherein it is sta:ted:
"~Iany

state courts recognize a discharge in
bankruptcy as a ground for a perpetual stay of
execution on a judgment taken against the bankrupt upon a dischargeable debt."
In 6 Aut. J1tr. (Rev. Ed.) 987, Bankruptcy, Section
753, it is stated:
"A stay of execution on a discharge judgment is a proper remedy to effectuate the discharge."
We subrnit the Utah Courts had jurisdiction and that
the plaintiff's l\Iotion to Strike was properly denied.

POINT II.
THE CONTROVERSY IS NOT RES JUDICATA.

Under his second point plaintiff presents two propositions:
That the judgrnent entered in this case is final in
the sense that defendant cannot now interpose decedent's
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discharge in bankruptcy bec.ause he failed to assert
the adjudication in the trial of the la-\vsuit resulting in
that judg1nent;
That c:ertain proceedings taken in the bankruptcy
court involved this controversy and hence has already
been decided adversely to defendant.
We will answer plaintiff's second point under the
following two headings:
1. Where judgment is obtained against a bankrupt
between the time of his adjudication and his discharge
on a debt in existence before aajudication, the debt and
judgment are discharged even though he did not assert
his adjudication and request a stay before judgment
obtained.
2.

Proceedings in the bankruptcy court in Colorado

are not res judicata of proceedings now before the court.
1. Where jud.gment is obtained aga,inst a bankrupt
betw-een the time of his .adjudication and his dischar.qe
on a debt in Bxistence before adjud;ication, the debt and
judgmen.t are discharged even though he did not assert
his adjuidication and request a stay before judgment
obtained.
Defendant's decedent prior to judgn1ent in the present case did not assert his adjudication or request a stay
thereunder to p·revent further proceedings. He had obtained his adjudication in bankruptcy July 7, 1941. This

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. 9
action was con1menced July 9, 1943 on a debt which was
due ~lay, 1937. Judgment vvas eventually entered against
hirn June 15, 1948. He obtained his discharge in bankruptcy January 14, 1949.
It, therefore, conclusively appears that the judgment
vvas obtained before discharge and under the cases, it
\vas entirely up to the bankrupt whether or not he would
assert his adjudication of bankruptcy to obtain a stay.
The cases hold that since this is rnerely a privilege granted to the bankrupt, he may assert it or waive it as he sees
fit and it will have no effect on the ultimate discharge
of the judgment so long as the discharge in bankruptcy
cornes subsequent to the entry of judgment. The important event is the discharge in bankruptcy. If that has been
obtained before judg1nent, then, of eourse, he would have
lost his right to assert the discharge as a release of the
obligation. However, that is not the ease at bar because
tlie judgment here was obtained before decedent obtained
his discharge in bankruptcy.
This matter has been specifically ruled upon by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Boynton v. Ball, 121 U.S. 457, 30 L. Ed. 985, 7 S. Ct. 981, 984.
This case was decided in 1887, but is still the law and the
relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Act are substantially
the same. In that case the judgment was. obtained after
the defendant had been adjudicated a bankrupt and before his discharge in bankruptcy, just as in the C\1Se at
bar. The court held that the judgment was the same debt
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that it 'vas before judgment and notwithstanding its
change in form, it still was discharged. Contention was
1nade by plaintiff that the bankrupt had waived his right
to claim discharge by his failure to call to the court's attention the ·adjudication and to secure a stay of further
proceedings in order to prevent plaintiff from obtaining
a judgment. The court overruled this contention of plaintiff and held that defendant had not waived his right to
assert the discharge when eventually it was obtained.
The court stated:

"* * * The whole· section is also clearly in1pressed with the idea that this is a provision primarily for the benefit of the bankrupt, that he may
be enabled to 'avoid being harassed in both courts
at the same time with regard to such debt. It is
therefore a right which he may waive. He may be
willing that the suit shall proceed in the state
court for many reasons, -first, because he is not
sure that he will ever obtain his discharge from
the court in bankruptcy, in which c:a'se it would-do
him no good to delay the proceedings at his expense in th'e state court; in the second place, he
may have a defense in the state court which he is
quite willing to rely upon there, and to have the
issue tried; in the thir'd place, he may he very
willing to have th-e amount in dispute liquidated
in that proceeding, in which case it becomes a debt
to be paid pro rata with his other aebts by the
assignee in bankruptcy.

"If for any of these reasons or for others,
he permits the cas:e to p·roceed to judgment in the
stat~ court, by failing to procure a stay of proceedings under the provisions, of this section of
the bankrupt law, or the 'assignee in bankruptcy
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does not intervene as he may do, (Hill v. Harding, 107 U.S. 631, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404), he does not
thereby forfeit his right to plead his final discharge in bankruptcy, if he shall obtain it a.t any
appropriate stage of the proc.eedings against him
in the state court. And if, as in the present case,
hrs final discharge is not obtained until after
judgment has been rendered against him in the
state court, he ma.y produce that discharge to the
state court, and obtain the stay of execution which
he asks for now. See McDougald v. Reid, 5 Ala.
810.
"In Rogers v. Western Marine Fire Ins. Co.,
1 La. Ann. 161, the court, in a similar case says:
'The proposition that Rogers should have pleaded
the pendency of the bankrupt proceedings in the
original suit, and cannot disturb the execution of
the judgment which is final, rs untenable. The
discharge in bankruptcy was posterior to th·e rendition of this judgment, and operated with the
S'ame force upon the debt after it assumed the
form of a judgment as it would have done had the
debt rem~ained in its original form of a promisstory note.' "
More recent cases to the saine ·effect are Badger v.
Jorda.n Ma.rsh Co. 7 256 Mass. 153, 152 N.E. 92; Hamilton
1_:. First State Bank 7 57 N. Dak. 143, 220 N.W. 644; Yale
University v. Wei'ssman 7 296 Mass. 23'9, 5 N.E. 2d 444.
The rule is stated in 6 Am. J1tr. (Rev. Ed.) 738, Bankruptcy, 'Se-c. 309 :
"The right of the bankrupt to the stay of a
suit pending against him at the time of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy may be waived. A
bankrupt does not, by failing to assert his right
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to a stay, p-reclude himself thereafte~-- from ple~d
ing his discharge in bankruptcy against the claim
'a'Sserte:d in th·e suit. If the discharge of the bankrupt is not obtained until after judg1nent has been
rendered against him in the state court on an action pending at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, he may then assert the discharge
as a defense to the enforcement of such judgment
and obtain a stay of execution."
Also see 1 Collier on· Bankruptcy, 14th Ed. 1670,
Section 17.32, wherein the rule is stated as follows:
"If the suit ha.s not been stayed, and a judgInent is entered P'rior to the award of a discharge,
the discharge, when obtained, may be availed of
as a har to further remedies on the judgment."
See also 6 An~. Ju.r. (Rev. Ed.) 739, Bankruptcy, Section 309.
Th.e authorities cited by plaintiff are not ap·plicable
to the ease at bar where the judgment was obtained prior
to di scharge.
1

We have no quarrel with such authorities as 6 Am.
Jur. (Rev. Ed.) 743, Bankruptcy, S·ec. 319, to the effect
that an application n1ay be made to a state court for stay
of proceedings based upon the adjudication in bankruptcy
se·eking to have th.at court stay proceedings until the
discharge may be obtained. While the bankrupt 1nay seek
such a stay, he need not do so. As pointed out in the
Boynton case, there are a number of reasons he may have
for desiring to proceed with the litigation. The obvious
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one in the present case is that decedent believed he had
a defense to the cause of action and plaintiff should not
be permitted to obtain a judg1nent if it could be prevented.
We are not interested in vvhat is the normal or the
safe practice in connection with the pleading of an adjudication, as referred to in 6 Am. Jur. (Rev. Ed.) 1025,
Bankruptcy, Sec. 807. The simple proposition presented
is vvhether or not a prior judgment is released by a subsequent discharge.
\\T e do not dispute the proposition that a discharge

in bankruptcy must he pleaded in order to be a defense
as ruled in Helrns v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263, 141 A.L.R.
1367. That case was an action to enjoin enforcement of a
judgment obtained against plaintiff. A discharge in
bankruptcy had been secured by plaintiff before the judgInent had been entered. The court held that this discharge was a defense and that it must be pleaded to releaS'e the debt. L: pon failure to plead it before judgment,
defendant could not thereafter raise it in proceedings
such as he had here commenced. This obviously is not
the situation where judgment is obtained before discharge. Until the discharge is obtained it cannot be
vleaded.

Parker v. ~1 urphy, 215 Mass. 72, 102 N .E. 85, vva.s an
application for an extraordinary writ of au,dita querela.
Plaintiff's own state1nent of the case conclusively estab-
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lishes that it is not in point and the court decided the debt
\vas not discharged because it had not been scheduled and
the creditor did not have notice or actual knowledge of
th'e bankruptcy pToceedings.

Berry Clothing Co. v. Shotnick, 249 Mass. 459, 144
N.E. 392, is not in p:oint. The action was against a surety
on an attachment bond. Defendant ~surety contended the
judgment in the c:ase where the attachment bond was filed
was void because it had been entered after the defendants there had filed a suggestion of an adjudication in
bankruptcy an'd a -certified copy of the adjudication. The
court held the judgment valid on the ground that the
Bankruptcy Act did not require a court to grant a stay
and in any event the defendants there did not follow c'Orrect practice in calling the adjudication to the court's
attention.
This ease holds, as applied here, that even though
decedent ha~d pleaded the adjudication the Utah Court
would nnt have been required to stay proce·edings but
could have continued to judgment.

In Woodruff v. Heiser, 150 F:. 2d 869 (10 CCA) a
creditor presented 'a claim based on a California judgn1ent to the referee. Previously the trustee in bankruptcy
had unsuccessfully moved in the C'alifornia -courts to set
aside· this judgment. The referee di'Sallowed the claim
on the ground he eould go into the validity of the judgInen t. The district court reversed. The circuit court re-
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yersed the district court. The supreme court, 327 U.S.
7~6, 66 S. Ct. 853, 90 L. Ed. 970, reversed the circuit
court. The ultimate holding was that the validity of the
judgment had been determined in the California proceedings to set it aside. No problem of adjudication or discharge was in any way involved.
We respectfully submit that it vvas unnecessary for
defendant to assert the adjudication in order to rely upon
the discharge obtained after judgment and that therefore defendant's 1notion to stay execution was properly
granted.

2. Proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court in Colorado
are not res judicata of proceed:ings now before the court.
Plaintiff contends that by two separate proceedings
eornmenced in the Federal District Court for the District
of Colorado in bankruptcy the matters here involved have
already been determined. His contention is that the Federal Di'strict Court has held the debt upon which the
judgment \vas obtained herein and the judgment herein
\Vere not discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding. It
is the contention of defendant administratrix that those
proceedings had nothing to do with the discharge of the
debt and judgrnent involved in this case and that the
court's rulings in those cases were based upon the proposition that the Bankruptcy Court was not interested
in the controversy and had no jurisdiction.
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The first of these proceedings was commenced October 28 1947 and rs embodied in Exhibits 2-A (pages
' and 4. The second was conrmenced March 6,
.16-23 inc.)
1951 and is en1bodied in Exhibits A, B and 3-A.
Plaintiff and decedent resorted to the Utah· Courts
to have two controversies decided. The first was the
case at bar. Plaintiff sued on a note and 1nortgage. The
defendants were the maker of the note and mortgage
(Hei'selt Construction Comp·any) and decedent, the endorser. The property mortgaged was owned by the comp-any and the mortga~ge was not foreclosed. Personal
judgment was entered against decedent and this is the
judginent here involved. This controversy was decided
in 116 Utah 83, 208 P. 2d 945.
Plaintiff also sought to quiet title to certain land
located in Salt Lake County. Decedent, the ahove company and other's were defendants. Ultin1ate decision in
this may be found in 118 Utah 573, 223 P. 2d 428.
Consideration of these two bankruptcy p-roce·edings
will demonstrate that they liave nothing to do with the
proposition of whether or not the discharge in bankruptcy is effective against the ju{lg1nent in the case at
bar.
In the first proceeding the effectiveness of the discharge could not possibly have been in issue or raised
because the discharge was not even in existence. It \vas
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entered January 1-l-, 1949. This proceeding \Vas comInenced October 28, 1947, one year and two 1non ths before and was decided ~1arch 15, 1948. Hence, decedent
did not at any ti1ne during this proceeding have a defense
to his liability as endorser on the note by reason of a
di:::;charge in bankruptcy.
Decedent asked the Bankruptcy Court to declare null
and void the note and mortgage upon which the judgment
here was based and to restrain plaintiff from further proceedings thereunder. Decedent alleged that plaintiff,
Peterson and decedent entered into a partnership and the
note and mortgage was in fact without any consideration
and \Vas made merely for the purpose of protecting plaintiff and Peterson in case of claims against the Heiselt
Construction Company. The partnership was operating
in the name of this cornpany. This is the basis on which
plaintiff clai1ned the note and n1ortgage was null and
void. Decedent also alleged that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act plaintiff had
filed an action in the State of Utah seeking to foreclose
the rnortgage. This was apparently the basis upon which
he asked the Bankruptcy Court to restrain further proceedings upon the mortgage (Ex. 2-A, pp. 18, 19).
Decedent in those proceedings also asserted that the
plaintiff haJd wrongfully taken possession of real estate
and personal property by virtue of a tax deed, said prop-
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erty being located in Salt Lake C'Ounty. He sought to
have the Bankruptcy Court require plaintiff to deliver
this property to him (Ex. 2-A, pp. 19-21).
In response to the petition, plaintiff filed a motion
to dis1nis's. The fundamental basis of this motion was the
lack ·of jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Court. The plaintiff asserted that the court had no jurisdiction over the
Heiselt Construction Company, the maker of the note and
1nortgage. Plaintiff also pointed out that the court had
no juris·diction to determine the matter set forth in the
petition but that the matters were for determination by
a court "of plenary jurisdiction." Plaintiff asserted that
the matters alleged in the petition amounted to a controversy between the parties and that the parties were entitled to a trial by jury and that such a trial could not be
had in the Bankruptcy C'ourt (Ex. 2-A, pp. 22, 23). Without considering the merits the Bankruptcy Court granted
plaintiff's motion on jurisdictional grounds. The holding
of the Bankruptcy Court is set forth on pages 5 and 6 of
Exhibit 4. It therein c'oncludes:
"The debtor seeks to have this Bankruptcy
Court, in 'said ·section 75 proceeding of a farmer
to adjudicate the rights bet\veen the sai(l debtor
and the respondent, A. E. Upton, and to enter
judgment therein adjudicating the rights of the
parties.
4

' Th~ f~cts. do not warrant the n1aking of any

such adJUdleation, or the entering of any such
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judgn1ent in this proceeding. Bankruptcy courts
are not trial courts, and if they were, these con troversies \Vere pending in other courts.
•'The petition must be dis1nissed without consideration of the merits.
"CONCLUSION: It is, therefore, ORDER·ED, .CONSIDER.ED, AND ADJUD(fED, that the
Inotion of the respondent, A. E. Upton, to the
juris diction of the Bankruptcy Court to have the
facts herein determined on the issue therein
stated, must be sustained and that conclusion requires that the said petition be dismissed.
1

"The petition of thEt debtor is, therefore, disInissed.
"Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 15th day of
~larch, 1948."
'l1hus it appears clearly and conclusively from the
order of the Bankruptcy Court that it refused to take
jurisdiction of the claims therein presented anid dismissed
the_ bankrupt's petition "'vi thou t consideration of the
1nerits."

In the second proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court in
Colorado, the bankrupt filed a Petition to Reopen after
his discharge had been granted and the bankruptcy proceedings had been closed. The prayer of the petition further asks that until the further order of the court plaintiff herein be enjoined and restrained fron1 selling or
other\vise disposing of the property involved in the quiet
title action. Neither the. note nor the mortgage nor the
property covered by the mortgage was even mentioned
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in this petition. Thereafter, a hearing was held and the
Con1plaint Ans,ver Counterclaiin, Findings of Fact,
' of Law 'anid Judgment entered in the case at
Conclusions
bar were ad1nited in evidence. For what pu.rpose it does
not appear. Fro1n the petition it conclusively appears
that the only purpose of these proceedings was to have
the B~ankruptcy Court determine that this, tax de·ed property was an asset of the bankrupt's estate. The bankrupt
sought to have the court ·determine this question adversely to the ju!dgrnent entered against him in plaintiff's action to quiet title brought in the Utah Courts. It is obvious from all of these proceedings, as -contained in Exhibit A, B, and 3-A, th~at the bankrupt did not seek any
adjudication of the question of "vhether or not the debt
and judgment here involved were· discharged by bankrup~tcy.

The plaintiff appeared in the proceedings and moved
to ·dismiss the p·etition on the ground that the court lackeld
jurisdiction over the subject Inatter and over the parties.
The sp.ecial master recom1nended that the Petition to reopen the case be denied and the court ordered that the
Petition to reopen be denied in conforn1ity \Vith such recommendation (Ex. A, p. 11, Ex. B).
The Bankruptcy Court made no finding or holding
concerning the note or judgment here involved. The comInission in quoting Collier on Bankruptcy was merely
pointing out that any stay in the bankruptcy proceedings
was judicial and not autom~atic, and if the bankrupt de-
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sired to take advantage of the stay he would have to assert it. The court was not referring to the discharge or
its effect and there is no 1nention made of the discharge
in all of these proceedings and the application of that discharge \vas in no way involved in the proceedings nlentioned. The court concluded that plaintiff had not violated any of the provisions of the stay since it had expired in September of 19'44 and that the reopening of the
ease \vould not benefit the debtor and that the determination of his rights to the Utah property by tax deed or
otherwise \vas not involved within the date of the stay
order. It \vas recon1mended that the application of the
debtor to reopen the case be denied (Ex. A, pp·. 10, 11).
At page 30 of his brief plaintiff asserts that by denying decedent's petition to reopen the bankruptcy proceedings it \Vas "thereby implied th.at L. H. I-Ieiselt, by reason
of his failure to schedule the indebtedness due the plaintiff was stopped fron1 further procedure before the Bankruptcy Court, because the 1J tah Court's jurisdiction had
attached." Just h·ow this could be implied we are at a
total loss to know. The court was very explicit in its
reasons for denying both of decedent's petitions and in
none of these was any determination Inade or could it
have been that decedent's debt to plaintiff was either
discharged or not discharged in bankruptcy.
We subn1it that there is no sh.owing in any of these
proceedings that the Bankruptcy Court was either asked
to or did or could rule upon the question of whether or
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not the ·debt and judgn1ent here involved ",.ere discharged
in bankruptcy and lienee there is. no doctrine of res judicata \vhich \vould prevent defendant ad1ninistratrix
fron1 asserting decedent'~s discharge in bankruptcy
against the judgrnent obtained in this case.

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF DECEDENT'S PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY WITHIN THE
PERIOD ALLOWED FOR THE FILING OF CLAIMS AND
HENCE HIS CLAIM WAS BARRED BY DECEDENT'S DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY.

The trial court found the obligation in this case \vas
not schedule·d ( 70 - Finding I\T). This \vas not fatal to
final discharge from the obligation. The discharge releases the debt if the creditor "had notice or actual kno\vledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy." 11 U.S.C.A. Section 35 (a) ( 3). This knovvledge should be received by
the creditor within the tin1e allowed for filing clain1s.
The following authorities sustain the Hbove staten1ents of law applicable here: Harris -v. B,utler, 91 Utah
11, 63 P. 2d 286 ( 1936) ; Birke.tt v. Columbia Bank, 195
U.S. 3±5, 25 s. Ct. 38, 49 L. Ed. 231 (1904); Blankenship
v. Oakley, 57 Cal. App. 2d 563, 134 P. 2d 863 (1943); Ray
v. Schubach, 10 Cal. App. 2d 122, 50 P. 2d 1073 (1933):
In re Beerman, 112 Fed. 66·2 (1901); Zinunernzan 1~.
Ketchum, 66 Kan. 98, 71 Pac. 264 (1903); Westall v.
Jackson, 218 N.C. 209, 10 S.E. 2d 674; Bank of Rothz;illt
v. Z.aleuke, 221 Mo. App. 1051, 295 S.W. 520; Bell v.
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Georgia. Chenzical W arks, 33 Ga. App. 286, 125 S.E. 871;
Bank of lVrightsville v. Four Seasons, 21 Ga. App. 453,
9± S.E. G-!9; Gurewitz v. Wise, 122 ~I e. 4±4, 120 A. 536;
~-~?ine c. Layden (Tex.) 91 S.W. 2d 983; In re Fischer, 274
~.Y.

Supp. 413.

The bankrupt filed his original Petition in Bankruptcy on October 23, 1940, and on N ove1nber 16, 1940,
the Bankruptcy Court issued the '~Notice of First Meeting of Creditors" setting the first date of the first Ineeting of creditors as Decernber 21, 1940 ( 70). Under the
la'v creditors then had until June 21, 1941 within which
to file their claims. 11 U.S.C.A., Section 93 (n).
~rhe

contention of defendant is that on at least three
occasions prior to June 21, 1941 plaintiff received actual
kno\vledge of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Plaintiff devotes space in his brief contending that
the burden of proof was upon defendant to show actual
kno\vledge by plaintiff of the bankruptcy proceedings.
\V e agree that this is the law. flowever, on appeal the
question to be deter1nined is whether or not there is substantial evidence supporting the Finding of Fa·ct hereinafter quoted. Harris v. Entler, supra. Finding of Fact
No. \:lis as follows:
"That shortly after the 16th day of N ove1nber,
1940 and before the first day of January, 1941,
the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, received notice and
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings
filed by the defen'dant, L. H. Heiselt; that the
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plaintiff, A. E. Upton, 'vas represented hy counsel, Raphael J. Moses, at the first n1eeting .of
creditors held on ApTil 29, 1941; that the plaintiff, A. E. U p·ton, again received notic~ and. actual
knowledge of said bankruptcy pToceed1ngs 1n May
and June of 1941; that he received notice and actual knowledge of the said bankruptcy proceedings in ample time to avail hilnself of the benefits
of the banruptcy law and in ample time to give
him an equal opportunity with other creditors."
From the general circu1nstance surrounding the relationship between decedent Heiselt and plaintiff and
plaintiff's bank, it is just inconceivable that plaintiff
would not have had actual notice of the decedent's bankruptcy p,roceeding.
Starting in 1936 and up until he went to California
in J anuary, 1941, plaintiff was actively overseeing and
watching the loans made to Heiselt Construction Company and to Mr. Heiselt (Ex. 4-A, p. 10). He talked
with 1\lr. Heiselt on numerous occasions concerning this
delinquency right up until he left in January, 1941 (Ex.
4-A, p. 12). 1\;lr. Heiselt never came to Denver without
seeing plaintiff and talking with him (Ex. 4-A, p. 21).
1

Directors' n1eetings were held at least once a n1onth
by the bank (Ex. 6-A, p. 5). The bank \vas given notice of
the bankruptcy proceedings and the proceedings \vere
discussed in the directors' 1neetings (Ex. 6-A, p. 6).
vVhen the notice was receive d Ernest Upton obtained the
record of all cla.in1s scheduled (Ex. 6-A, p. 6).
1
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vVhen plaintiff left for Palo Alto he turned these
affairs over to his brother (Ex. 4-A, p. 13). Upon his return he naturally was interested in the progress of these
loans and \vas infor1ned concerning their status (Ex. 4-A,
p. 14).
The depositions disclose that on at least three specific occasions plaintiff received actual kno,vledge of the
proceedings in bankruptcy. First, he received notice
~hortly

after plaintiff's bank received notice of the claim

'vhich -vvould be prior to January 1, 1941. Second, plaintiff received further notice someti1ne during

~fay

or June

of 1941, subsequent to the return of plaintiff from Palo
..~.\Ito.

Third, plaintiff was representeld by counsel ·at the

first 1neeting of creditors held April 29, 1941.
The deposition of Ernest B. Upton establishes notice
to plaintiff very soon after receipt of notice by the bank.
The petition in bankruptcy and his schedule of debts were
filed by 1\Ir. Heiselt October 23, 1940 (Ex. 1-A), and no"tice of the first meeting of creditors \vas mailed N ovember 14, 1940. It appears from the deposition of R.aphael

,J. :\Ioses that these notices were in the hands of creditors at least by November 20, 19·40, because he, as an attorney for one of the creditors, had received this notice
by that tiine (Ex. 5-A, p. 3). A conference was held with
l.loses on November 22, 1940 concerning deceldent's bankruptcy (Ex. 5-A, p. 3).
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At pages 6 and 7 of his deposition (Ex. 6-A) 1\lr.
Ernest Upton testified as follows:

"Q. Well, do you recall the time that the
'bank received notice that Mr. Heiselt was in
bankruptcy~

of

''A.

Yes, I knew about that.

"Q.

And do you recall when you first learned

it~

"A.

I couldn't now, personally.

"Q.
You were consulted about filing the
claim, were you not~
"A.

Certainly.

"Q. And did you prepare the claim as the
attorney for the bank~
''A. I presume I did. I can't tell you definitely, right now. I have no copy of it in the files.

"Q.

Did you discuss that matter with your

brother~

"A. I ,don't recall any specific discussions
but of course it was all under discussion by the
bank in the bank meetings.

"Q. The matter of 1\{r. Heiselt's bankruptcy
was discussed in those meetings~
"A.

Yes, oh, yes.

"Q. And of course the bank was vitallv interested in this $12,000 loan~
of

''A. Certainly, as the hank itself got a notice
of it, a~d I went over to the bankruptcy court and
got their record of the claims "\Vhich J\;fr. Heiselt
set up in his bankruptcy.
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"Q. And amongst those you knew that there
'vas a claim of $30; that is, that Mr. Heiselt scheduled a debt of $30 owed by him to your brother
_._>\. E. Upton~
"A.

Oh, yes, I saw that in the schedule.

"Q. Did you talk with Mr. Upton, your
brother, about that~
"A.

I a1n sure that I told him about it.

"Q. And do you recall when~
"A. Well, that would be following the tin1e
that I went over and got the list of the claims.

"Q. Do you remember when you did

that~

"A. I couldn't give you the date, no, but that
\Vas after his listing was filed over there, and I
specifically went over there to see if the bank
claim \vas filed, which it was."
. A_ t page 14 he gave further details of this notifica-

tion \vhen he testified as follows:

"Q. When you called to Mr. A. E. Upton's
attention the scheduling of his debt, \vhat did he
say~

"MR. CHRISTENS-EN:
about the $30 ~
"MR.

R~OBERTS:

Are you talking

The $30 debt, yes.

"A. What he actually did say, it was something more or less to the effect that it was a joke.
He said, 'He owes me a lot more than that.' "
Plaintiff also received notice of the proceedings
shortly after his return fron1 Palo Alto. It is clear that
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plain tiff was handling the policy tna.tters relating to Heiselt Construction Company and Heiselt loans 1nade by the
bank. He would be vitally concerned with any proceedings had in relation to these obligations.
Plaintiff testified concerning his triv to

P~alo

Alto

as follows (Ex. 4-A, p. 8):

"Q. When did you leave Denver to go to
Palo Alto-about~
"A.
uary.

"Q.

I would say about in the n1onth of Jan-

What

year~

"A. 1941."
Plaintiff testified about his return to Denver (page
8) :

"Q.

And you stayed in Palo Alto until when°?

''A.

To the best of my knowledge and belief,
I re1nained there until just in time to get hack here
by the 1st of May.

"Q.

.

May~

"A. Yes-wait a minute-no, no; I just can't

g1ve the date; I know that I was in Denver the
28th of May. I h·ave definite knowledge of that
by reason of having issued a check here to send
out there for $225, to my wife."
Concerning his receipt of knowledge of the proceedings after his return he testified (pages 14, 15):
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'"Q. When you came back you, of course,
again talked over the things which you had been
handling for the bank before you left~
"A. There was nothing to talk over in the
n1atter of the Heiselt case because that was settled
'vhile I w·as gone. It was filed in bankruptcy
court, as I recall.

"Q.
got

And you learned about that when you

back~

"A.

Yes.

"Q. And who discussed 'vith you that fact,
do you recall~
"A. Well, if there wa.s any discussion about
it, I would say it would be E. B. Upton.

* *
''Q. But when you returned here from Palo
..~.-\Ito they discussed that matter with you and told
you about it~

* *

"A. There w·as no discussion about it; there
'vas no occasion for discussion.
it~

''Q.

Well, they told you about

"A.

They told me what they had done.

"Q. Tha.t they had gone down to Ala1nosa
to check into this bankruptcy matter of Mr. Heiselt 'sand to present this claim~
"A. Yes.

"Q. And they told you that im1nediately upon your return~
"A. No, I wouldn't say in1mediately. They
n1·ay have told me the first day I was here and they
may not have told me for a month.
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"Q. But it would be within a month after
your return~

"A. Not necessarily. It would be if the
occasion arose for the matter to be brought up."
Because of the length of time, plaintiff refused to
attempt to specify any particular date as to when he
he·ard of this matter, but board meetings were held once
a month (Ex. 4-A, p. 16), and concerning this he said
(page 17):

"Q. You knevv they told you in this board
meeting, or it came up, that they vvent down and
presented this claim~
"A.

That's right, they gave 1ne this inforina-

tion.
"Q. And that they had presented it in this
bankruptcy mat·ter at Alamos~a ~
"A.

Yes."

Ernest B. Upton testified that he made the trip to Alamosa on a Sunday and the hearing was on

~fay

5, 1941.

On this occasion they filed the proof of clain1 in behalf
of the bank (Ex. 6-A, pp. 7, 8). l\fr. Ernest B. Upton testified ('pages 16, 17) :
"Q. Is it your recollection that it was shortly
after he got back that the n1a.tter of Heisel t was
discussed with hiln ~ The proceedings in Ala1nosa.
''A. I haven't said they were discussed. They
would be rep·orted to him-app·roval of the claim
and the amount woul~ be reported, and of course
Mr. Land, vvho was With me a.nd the witness had

'
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\Yith hin1 the bank record and knew it all and was
there all the time-probably he told A. E. before
I did.
~'Q.

But you recall telling hiln1

"A. No.
"Q. , . . ou recall reporting it at a board of
directors meeting~
"A. I wouldn't say I reported it; I would say
it 'vas discussed there. It, naturally, would be.
"Q.

And in the presence of J\1:r. A. E.

"A.

He vvas there, yes."

Upton~

The third notice clai1ned is that Raphael J. Moses
represented plaintiff at the creditors' n1eeting of Ap-ril
:29, 1941. The records of the bankruptcy court, intro'duced
in evidence, indicate that he represented plaintiff (Ex.
7-"'\). lie testified that certainly the records \Vould not be
in error (Ex. 5-A, p. 7). He testified (Ex. 5-A, p. 3) :

"* * * so far as the authority for entering the
appearance of National City Bank and A. E. Upton, I have no direct recollection, but I am convinced in rny own mind that that authority arose
either out of correspondence which has since been
destroyed, or out of this meeting in Denver on November 22nd, as it has never been our practice to
enter any appearance 'vithout some authority to
do so."
His best recollection was that he 1net in Denver with
~[r. Ernest B. T~ pton on November 22, 1940 (Ex. 5-A, p.
3). He further testified that he "\vould have no other
cause to consult \Yith }f r. Ernest B. l~ pton other than in
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connection \vith these bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiff acknowledged that Ernest B. lTpton was his principal attorney when he testified as follows (Ex. -1-A, p.
13):
"Q. Was he your personal attorney during
that p·eriod of time, 1940 and '41 ~
."A. Well, in a sense he has been 1ny principal attorney ever since he has been practicing la\v
in Denver."
We submit fron1 all these circumstances the probabilities are that ~Ir. :1Ioses 'vas authorized to represent
plaintiff at the creditors' meeting in April, 1941. It is
very unlikely that an attorney would 1na.ke an unauthorized ap·pearance in a matter such as this. Certainly it
should take more than the testimony of the U ptons to
upset the circumstances detailed above, and it certainly
indicated that :1\tfr. Moses was representing both the bank
and plaintiff in these proceedings under authority lawfully granted.
This judicia.! record (Ex. 7-A), solemnly made over
thirteen years ago, is substantial evidence that plaintiff
was repTesented at the first creditors' 1neeting and supports the finding n1ade by the trial court to that effect.
Ernest Upton even denied that he had taken step~
to have the bank represented at th·e first meeting of
creditors (Ex. 6-A, p·. 10). This was a $12,000 claim and
it vvould he very tmlikely that the bank would p-ermit its
interest to go unrepresente'd ;at this first 1neeting. The
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only person representing the bank \vas l\Ir. Moses. We
~ub1nit that this testi1nony by Ernest Upton casts serious
doubts upon his credibility or his memory.
l~laintiff's

credibility \VaS also dirninished \Vhen he
atternpted on direct examination to claim his first knowledge of Heiselt's bankruptcy was sometime in 1947, when
he n1ade formal appearance in the proceedings represented hy attorney Hudson (Ex. 4-A, pp. 4, 5).
The 1Ttah case of Harris v. Entler, supra, is closely
1n point. The debt \Vas not scheduled. The court held
it released because the creditor had knowledge of the
proceedings. The evidence was in conflict on this propo~ition

and the finding of kno\vledge was therefore sup-

ported. The court stated:

"* * * This finding reads as f ollo\vs : ·That
the defendant was adjudicated a bankrupt on December 3, 1929, and that the plaintiff had due and
legal notice and actual knowledge of said bankruptcy proceedings. That about February 27,
1931, the defendant was granted a discharge fro1n
all his debts and liabilities including the debt and
liability on \vhich this action is brought.'
"'It is conceded the debt sued upon was not
listed in the bankruptcy proceeding. Defendant
at the time did not recognize it as a debt. l-Ie kne\v
the claim was made by plaintiff and should have
listed it with a notation that the den1and was disputed. Tyrrel v. Harnn1erstein, 33 ~fise. · 505, G7
N.Y.S. 717. The court, however, found that plaintiff had notice and actual kno\vledge of the bank-
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ruptcy proceeding and that defen dant "\vas discharged fron1 all his debts and liabilities including
the debt owing to plaintiff. The finding of actual
knowledge is a finding of an ultimate fact and
not a conclusion. It is supported by the testi1nony
of defendant that plaintiff knew of the proceedings in 1930, although such testimony was disp·uted by plaintiff. The evidence being in conflict,
the finding of the trial court must stand.
1

1

"Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provide~
that: 'A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a
bankrupt from all of his p,rovable debts, except
such as * * * (third) ha.ve not been duly scheduled
in ti1ne for p,roof and allowance, with th·e name
of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless
such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of
the pToceedings in bankruptcy.' 11 U.S.C.A. Sec.

35; 3 R.C.L. 336."
Plaintiff sp,eculates that his $30.00 debt 'vas not
schelduled. It appea.rs on Exhibit 1-A. There is no eYidence of any alteration of the record and 11oses testified:
"I believe it 1vas listed in his schedules which
were filed with the Petition in Bankruptcy." (Ex.
5-A, P'· 5)
The authorities first cited under this point teach
that actual knovvledge n1ay come to the creditor in an
inforn1al manner and need not be direct fron1 th.e debtor
or the court.
The proof of knowledge need not be by direct and
specific notice. No different rule should be applied here
than to other civil or criminal cases. Circumstantial evi-
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dence is as potent here as in other fields of the law. In
this case there is testirnony that the decedent's proceedings in bankruptcy were brought to plaintiff's attention
by his brother and in hank directors' meetings. Thirteen
year~ later no ·w·itness would specifically say the exact
date or tin1e this "\vas done. This does not mean that
the trier of fact 1nnst throw up his hands and say legally
it cannot be deter1nined. \Vhat are the probabilities~
Bankruptcy "~as filed October 23, 1940. A schedule of
debts \Yas filed. Notice \Yas sent to plaintiff's bank at
least by N ove1nber 20, 1940. Plaintiff's brother checked
the schedules to see if the bank's clain1 \Vas scheduled. He
found it \Yas and also one of plaintiff's claims scheduled.
He told plaintiff about it and the bank's claim. Would
it be reasonable to suppose that this subject was discussed and con1n1ented upon seven or eight months after
the event \Yhen plaintiff in November and December of
1940, and at least part of J'anuary, 1941, was actively
\vatching the Heiselt transactions~ This should be, and
\ve sub1nit is, sufficient to support a finding that plaintiff acquired knowledge within the months of N overnber
and Decen1ber, 1940 and January, 19"41.
This same arguine·nt applies to the occasion after
plaintiff's return in May, 1941. He was again notified
after his return of the bankruptcy proceedings. He arrived sometime prior to May 28, because on that day he
sent a check from Denver to his wife in California. \Vould
it be reasonable to assume that the $12,000 IIeiselt clain1
\\Thich he had been handling before his departure would
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he left unnoticed for a n1onth after his return'? Would it
not be reasonable to find that a.s soon a.s he returned one
of his first inquiries would concern this clai1n ~ Certainly
that is the probability and supports a finding that in the
month of May he learned of these bankruptcy proceedings and as found by the court in· time to avail himself
of the benefit of the bankruptcy law and in ample ti1ne
to afford him equal opportunities with the other creditors.
We submit that th·e Finding of Fact VI (70) is supported by substantial evidence.

POINT IV.
THE DEBT UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED
WAS A PROVABLE DEBT.

Concededly under 11 U.S.C.A., 'Sec. 35 a debt to be
released by discharge in bankruptcy must be a provable
debt. 11 U.S.C.A., Sec. 103 sets forth debts which are
provable.
The typ,e of debt upon which the judgment is based
clearly a:p,p.ears from the case of Upton v. Heiselt Const.
Co., 116 Utah 83, 208 P. 2d 945. It appears that 1\fr. Heiselt was the endorser of a note signed by the Heiselt Construction Coinpany as Inaker. That endorselnent provided:

"'I, we or ei.
"th e~ of us, hereby guarantee the
payment of the Within note, 'va.iving demand presentment for paJinent notice of dishonor p;otest
. of protest. *' ** '"
'
an d notice
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rrhe note \VaS dated ~fay 15, 1936, and was payable
)[a~" 15, 1937. Hence, at the time that the proceedings
in bankruptey were con11nenced this debt was long past
due and ~Ir. Heiselt's liability thereon \vas fixed.
Section 103 supra, so far as Inaterial, provides :
'" (a) Debts of the bankrupt 1nay be proved
and allo\ved against his estate \Yhich are founded
upon (1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgInent or an instrument in \Vriting, absolutely owing at the ti1ne of the filing of the petition by or
against him, whether then payable or not, with any
interest thereon which would have been recoverable at that date or \vith a rebate of interest upon
such as were not then paya;ble and did not bear
interest; * * *."

*

* * *

an open account, or a contract express
or implied; ( 5) provable debts reduced to judgInents after the filing of the petition and before
the consideration of the bankrupt's application
for a discharge, less costs incurred and interest
accrued after the filing of the petition and up to
the time of the entry of such judgments; * * *
" ( -±)

*

*

* *

"(8) contingent debts and contingent contractualliabilities; * * * .''
Subdivision (8) above was added by an amendment
1n

1938. Even before the inclusion of that subdivision

liability of an endorser was held a provable debt in M a.y-

uard v. Elliott, 283 lT.S. 27:1, 51 S. Ct. 390, 392, 75 ].;. Ed.
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1028 ( 1931). The principal debt \Yas not due at the tin1e
the petition in bankruptcy \YaS filed. rrhe trustee ('Oiltended that liability as an endorser \vas not a prova:blP
debt in bankruptcy. The Supre1ne Court in holding to the
contrary stated:

"But the liability of an indorser is of neifher
class. Its an1ount is certain; and the contingeney
of notice of dishonor to the indorser is within the
control of the creditor, so as to place his clai1n, so
far as its certainty of accrual and its susceptibility
of liquidation are concerned, up·on the same footing as the contract of indemnity which was held
provable in Williams v. U.S. Fidelity Co., supra,
although the clairnant had done nothing at the
time of the bankruptcy to satisfy the liability for
which the indemnity was given. See also Central
Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, supra, pages
593, 594 of 240 U.S., 36 S. Ct. 412.
"The claim against the indorser of paper not
matured at the time of the bankruptcy thus stands
on the same plane as contracts of suretyship or
guarantee of payment of a debt not due until after
the bankruptcy. See In re Lyons Beet Sugar
Refining Co., supra; Collier on Bankruptcy, supra; Remington on Bankruptcy, supra. Even
though not due until after the year allowed for
proof of claims, if proved in time, such a claim
may he liquidated a.s are other unmatured claims.
In re Buzzini, sup~ra, page 830 of 183 F·. As the
claim is provable, and as notice of dishonor after
the petition is filed is necessary only to charge
the indorser, in the event he does not secure his
discharge, the claimant need not give notice of
dishonor in order to share in the estate. ·see ColInan Co. v. Withoft, supra, page 253 of 195 F."
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Plaintiff's contention is that the endorsers liability
on a note secured by n1ortgage is "too contingent." Suffice it to say subdivision 8 specifies all contingent debts,
and hence 1nust cover this "contingent" debt.
In re

I.~ehrenkranss,

14 Fed. Supp. G82, cited by plaindecided in 1936 before the addition of subdi-

tiff, \Vas
vision (8).

In any event the court concedes that if the person
guaranteed \Vas in default at the time of bankruptcy it
\\~ould be provable. There the principal \vas not in default
and no suit could be brought. Flere the principal was in
default at the tin1e of bankruptcy and suit against him
'"·ould not be preinature.

Peterson v. Johnson N,ul Co., 204

~finn.

300, 283 N.W.

;)Ill,

\vas an action to enjoin defendant fron1 competing

\\~ith

plaintiff in the business of selling nuts in certain

areas. This could hardly be in point here.
\V e subn1it that the debt at the tin1e decedent filed

for bankruptcy was a provable debt within the bankruptcy statutes and hence dischargeable.
CONCI.JUSION
We respectfully subn1it that the debt and the judgInent into which it n1erged were discharged in bankruptcy
because plaintiff had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy
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proceedings and '"as represented therein. The District
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County is a court of general jurisdiction and had jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposition of whether
or not the judgment rendered by the Utah court had
been discharged in bankruptcy. The debt, under the 1938
A1nendment to the Bankruptcy Act, although contingent,
was a provable debt. The proceedings here instituted
by decedent and the defendant administratrix were the
first and only proceedings wherein a court has been asked
to deter1nine the question of discharge of this debt in
bankruptcy.
We respe:ctfully submit that the judg1nent of the
trial court should be affirn1ed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBER.TS
& BLACK
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS

Counsel for Respondent, Annie Ray
Heiselt, Administratrix of the Estate
of L. H. Heiselt, Deceased
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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